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‘Old Citizenry’ in a New State
Civic Militias and Political Crises in Haarlem and Groningen in the 
First Half of the Nineteenth Century1
carolien boender
Historians have studied the regime change of 1813 in the Netherlands mainly from 
a national perspective, as the invented new beginning of the United Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. However, research on Northern Germany has shown that an 
urban perspective on the regime change of 1813 reveals continuities with the early 
modern period. The civic initiatives to preserve urban security remind of the civic 
commitment found in early modern corporate society. Students of the history of 
The Netherlands generally assume that urban citizenship withered away soon after 
the introduction of national citizenship in 1795 and so did the civic discourse on the 
importance of urban society and the civic commitment to the urban community. 
But did this really disappear together with the early modern political system? This 
article takes an urban perspective on the regime change of 1813 and studies the 
appearance of voluntary civic militias in Haarlem and Groningen. Their actions 
remind of practices and traditions of early modern civic republicanism. Was 
‘1813’ a final upsurge of practices of civic republicanism and local authority or just 
one example of a broader persistence of urban civic traditions in the nineteenth 
century?
Historici hebben de regimewisseling van 1813 in Nederland over het algemeen vooral 
vanuit een nationaal perspectief bestudeerd, als (een al dan niet geconstrueerd) 
beginpunt van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Onderzoek naar Noord-
Duitsland leert dat een stedelijk perspectief op de regimewisseling continuïteiten 
met de vroegmoderne tijd aan het licht brengt. De burgerlijke initiatieven om de 
veiligheid van de stad te bewaken bijvoorbeeld doen denken aan het betrokken 
burgerschap uit de vroegmoderne corporatieve samenleving.
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Groningen, i (Groningen 1864) 361-363.
3 Thomas von der Dunk, ‘“Oude partijschappen die 
voor altoos vergeten moeten zijn”: De provincie 
Groningen gedurende de omwenteling in 1813’,  
in: Historisch Jaarboek Groningen (Assen 2001)  
61-81; Busch, ‘Dagverhaal van de blokkade’,  
224-363.
4 Wybe Wouters, Blijde welkomstgroet aan de 
gewapende Groningers bij hunne zegenpralende 
wederkomst van Appingedam en Delfzijl 
(Groningen 1814) 7-8; The Knuttel Collection 
(hereafter Knuttel) 23961; Other poems on 
Groningen: Knuttel 23959; Knuttel 23960; 
Knuttel 24057; Knuttel 23589; Knuttel 23961.
Historici veronderstellen echter over het algemeen dat in Nederland stedelijk 
burgerschap al snel na de introductie van nationaal burgerschap in 1795 verdween. 
Datzelfde zou gelden voor het daaraan verbonden stedelijke vertoog over het 
belang van de stedelijke corporatieve samenleving en de burgerlijke betrokkenheid 
bij deze gemeenschap. Maar is die breuk wel zo duidelijk? Om die vraag te 
beantwoorden kiest dit artikel een stedelijk perspectief en bestudeert de rol van 
vrijwillige burgermilities in de regimewisseling van 1813 in Haarlem en Groningen. 
Hun optreden weerspiegelt de praktijk van het vroegmoderne stedelijke 
republicanisme. Was 1813 de laatste opleving van vroegmoderne tradities of zijn er 
redenen om aan te nemen dat stedelijke burgerlijke tradities langer bleven bestaan?
On 25 May 1814 the locally organised National Guard (Nationale Garde), civic 
militias (gewapende burgermagt) and a voluntary militia of Groningen were 
enthusiastically welcomed back with a public ceremony on the city’s central 
market square.2 For more than six months the National Guard and militias 
had been fighting the French at Delfzijl, a town in the vicinity of Groningen. 
Immediately after Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig peace had been restored in 
the western part of the Netherlands and a new state had been established. In 
the province of Groningen, however, it had taken months before the French 
troops had finally given in.3
The joyous return of the militias inspired several local poets to write 
celebratory poems. As one would expect, these poems praised the patriotic 
behaviour of the militiamen. More surprisingly is the frequent use of the 
terms burger (citizen) and burgerij or burgerschaar (citizenry). Wijbe Wouters 
for instance wrote: ‘People of Groningen, sing songs of victory/As your brave 
citizenry/[…] returns to its fireplace and altar’.4 With ‘brave citizenry’ (dapp’re 
Burgerschaar) Wouters specifically meant the civic militia rather than the 
citizens of Groningen or the Netherlands. He was certainly not the only one. 
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5 Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken, i (The Hague 
and Amsterdam 1814) 90, 265; Other examples 
are: Johannes Enschedé, Aanteekeningen van 
het gebeurde in de stad Haarlem van 15 November 
tot 2 December van het jaar 1813 (Haarlem, 
approximately 1863) 6; Theodorus van Swinderen, 
‘Dagverhaal van het gebeurde te Groningen’, 
in: Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis en oudheidkunde 
inzonderheid van de provincie Groningen, i 
(Groningen 1864) 319. In his correspondence 
the commander of Groningen’s civic militia 
consequently wrote ‘burgers’ when he meant 
militiamen. ga, toegang 1605, inv.nr. 415, 
December 1813.
6 Maarten Prak, ‘Burgers in beweging: Ideaal 
en werkelijkheid van de onlusten te Leiden in 
1748’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de 
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 106:3 (1991) 365-393, 
372. 
7 Maarten Prak, Republikeinse veelheid, 
democratisch enkelvoud. Sociale verandering in 
het revolutietijdvak ’s-Hertogenbosch 1770-1820 
(Nijmegen 1999). It is, for example, generally 
assumed that urban citizenship withered away 
soon after 1795: Maarten Prak, ‘Burghers into 
citizens: Urban and National Citizenship in the 
Netherlands during the Revolutionairy Era (c. 
1800)’, Theory and Society 26:4 (1997) 403-420; 
Joost Kloek and Karen Tilmans, ‘Inleiding’, in: 
idem, Burger. Een geschiedenis van het begrip 
‘burger’ in de Nederlanden van de Middeleeuwen 
tot de 21e eeuw (Amsterdam 2002) 9; Wyger 
Velema, ‘Beschaafde republikeinen. Burgers 
in de achttiende eeuw’, in: Remieg Aerts and 
Henk te Velde (eds.), De stijl van de burger. 
Over Nederlandse burgerlijke cultuur vanaf de 
middeleeuwen (Kampen 1998) 80-99, esp. 81; 
Ido de Haan, Het beginsel van leven en wasdom. 
De constitutie van de Nederlandse politiek in de 
negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 2003) 93, 185; 
Maarten Prak and Jan Luiten van Zanden, 
Nederland en het poldermodel. Sociaal-economische 
geschiedenis van Nederland, 1000-2000 
(Amsterdam 2013) 183-186.
In the Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken, for instance, Nijmegen’s civic militia of 
1813 was referred to as the ‘old citizenry’ (oude burgerij).5 
Until 1795, it had been common practice to speak of the civic militia 
as the ‘citizenry’. Serving in the civic militia was a duty that came with the 
benefits connected to early modern urban citizenship. Over the centuries 
the institution of the civic militia had functioned as a platform to vent ideas 
on urban politics. The civic militia was seen as a means through which the 
commons were represented; this explains why civic militia were referred to as 
burgerij.6 In short, Wouters and others referred to the militia’s responsibility to 
protect the urban community in an early modern way.
The fact that people like Wouters understood citizenship first and 
foremost in local terms may come as a surprise, considering the developments 
that had taken place in the decades preceding 1813. After all, during the 
Batavian-French period national citizenship was introduced. Moreover, 
since the founding of the Batavian Republic in 1795, there had been many 
attempts to turn the local citizen militias into a national institution. In Dutch 
historiography the dominant view in this regard is that advanced by Maarten 
Prak, who has argued that from 1795 onwards the urban corporate society 
fell apart and the public discourse on the urban community as a civic society 
withered away.7 But did this discourse and the practices of civic republicanism 
really disappear together with the early modern political system? In contrast 
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8 Ralf Pröve, Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus und 
die ‘Macht des Volkes’. Civile Ordnungsformationen 
und kommunale Leitbilder politischer Participation 
in den deutschen Staaten vom Ende des 18. bis zur 
Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen 2000); 
Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Cities and War: Modern 
Military Urbanism in Hamburg and Leipzig during 
the Napoleonic Era’, German History 35:3 (2017) 
381-402. 
9 The continuities in urban civic engagement 
studied in this article therefore differ from ‘the 
unmistakable legacy’ of a non-political, moral and 
social citizenship as noted by Remieg Aerts, ‘Civil 
Society or Democracy? A Dutch Paradox’, Berichten 
en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden 125:2/3 (2010) 209-236.
10 Matthijs Lok, ‘The Bicentennial of “1813-1815” and 
National History Writing: Remarks on a New 
Consensus’, bmgn – Low Countries Historical Review 
103:4 (2015) 111-120; Matthijs Lok, Windvanen. 
Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en 
Franse Restauratie (1813-1820) (Amsterdam 2009); 
Ido de Haan, ‘Een nieuwe staat’, in: Ido de Haan, 
Paul den Hoed and Henk te Velde, Een nieuwe 
staat. Het begin van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
9-33; Henk te Velde, ‘De herdenking en betekenis 
van 1813’, ibidem, 363-383. In his thesis Bart 
Verheijen has challenged the construction of ‘1813’, 
but he does not question the national perspective 
on 1813: Bart Verheijen, Nederland onder Napoleon. 
Partijstrijd en natievorming, 1801-1813 (Nijmegen 
2017) 251-294, 299-305. Wilfried Uitterhoeve, 
1813-Haagse bluf. De korte chaos van de vrijwording 
(Nijmegen 2013) has exceptionally taken a local 
approach, which is discussed by Judith Pollmann 
and Henk te Velde in this issue.
to most literature on the Netherlands, students of the urban history of 
Northern Germany have argued the opposite, showing connections between 
early modern and modern urban civic engagement.8 A similar approach could 
be of help in our understanding of Dutch history, because until 1848 the 
Netherlands, like Germany, had a weaker nation-state, which left room for 
initiatives by urban authorities and citizens. This article therefore addresses 
the aforementioned question by investigating 1) the role the persistence 
of early modern civic ideas played in thinking about local solutions to the 
national crisis of 1813; and 2) whether ‘1813’ should be seen as a temporary 
upsurge of older practices or as an invitation to reconsider the nature of Dutch 
governance in the early nineteenth century in a broader way.9
So far the regime change of 1813 has mainly been studied as a national 
event and the beginning of a new era although in recent years historians have 
acknowledged that ‘1813’ as a national moment of renewed adherence to the 
House of Orange is to a certain extent a national myth that was constructed 
after the event.10 I believe, however, that students of the early-nineteenth-
century Netherlands have much to gain by bridging the gap between the early 
modern and modern periods. One way is by exploring the urban rather than 
the national dimension of 1813. Because the early modern world was in many 
ways a local world, a local approach could unveil continuities between the two 
periods, rather than ruptures. In that way, it could enrich our understanding 
of the regime change of 1813. 
The collapse of the French regime and the withdrawal of the French 
troops created a power vacuum all over the Northern Netherlands: the 
national government was weakened, and both citizens and local governments 
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11 ga (Groninger Archieven), toegang 1605, inv.nr. 
318 (oude indeling), ‘Resolutieboek, notulen 1803-
1815’, deliberatie van 29 november 1813, 687-692.
12 ga, toegang 1605, inv.nr. 526, minuten van 
uitgegane stukken, 2 January 1813 – 31 December 
1813.
took matters into their own hands. For that reason, ‘1813’ is a suitable 
moment to examine continuing practices of civic engagement. Apparently, as 
in Groningen and Nijmegen, in several cities voluntary urban civic militias 
were constituted to restore peace and order. The reappearance of these militias 
are the central topic of this study. 
I will focus on two local case studies. The first one concerns the city of 
Haarlem, located in the western half of the Netherlands, where the transfer 
of power was relatively peaceful. The second case study deals with the city 
of Groningen, which after November 1813 found itself in a situation of war. 
Allied troops partly took over local command, and military companies were 
marching in and out of the ramparts. The city ran out of supplies and money, 
in part because the French tax system was discontinued after the French 
civil servants had fled, taking the tax administration with them.11 Moreover, 
local militias faced hardships at the front because the city failed to provide 
them with sufficient clothing, equipment and bandages and a continuous 
threat came from the French sallying from Delfzijl.12 They even appeared 
in the vicinity of the city of Appingedam, located just 25 kilometres from 
Groningen, looting livestock and harvest.
The correspondence of the local governments of both cities shows 
how these governments tried to uphold local authority in the face of a 
possible return of the French troops, the interventions of the Cossacks and the 
establishment of the new national government. Moreover, for Haarlem I had 
at my disposal a rich autobiographical source written by Johannes Enschedé 
(1785-1866) who was in charge of ‘garrison issues’ in the local government 
in 1813. Unlike in Haarlem, the sources in Groningen did not allow me to 
exactly reconstruct the role of the civic militia in Groningen in the days before 
the return of the Prince of Orange. They did, however, provide insight into the 
situation during the days and months thereafter. Because these sources cover 
a dissimilar period, they did not enable me to compare Groningen to Haarlem 
systematically. However, this article does not aim to compare both cities, it 
rather seeks to answer a specific question on continuity for which the case 
studies complement each other.
In the following paragraphs of this article I will, first, provide an 
overview of the relevant historiographical debates. Next I will discuss the 
events of 1813 and explain why they are part of a tradition of early modern 
civic engagement. Subsequently, I will show how 1813 views on urban 
autonomy fit a broader pattern of resistance against increasing centralisation. 
Finally, I will address the question whether ‘1813’ was a final resurgence of 
early modern practices of civic republicanism or just one example of a form of 
urban citizenship that would continue well into the nineteenth century.
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13 Paul Knevel, Burgers in het geweer. De schutterijen 
in Holland 1550-1700 (Hilversum 1994) 15.
14 Prak, ‘Burgers in beweging’, 366, 390-393.
15 Maarten Prak, ‘Citizens, Soldiers and Civic 
Militias in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe’, Past and Present 228:1 (2015) 94-
123. See also: Arthur Salomons, ‘De rol 
van de Amsterdamse burgerbeweging in 
de wetsverzetting van 1672’, Berichten en 
mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis des 
Nederlanden 106:2 (1991) 198-219; Jan de Jongste, 
‘Dageraad der democratie? De politieke 
dimensie van de burgerlijke oproerigheid tijdens 
stadhouder Willem iv (1747-1751)’, Groniek 27 
(1994) 45-57, 124.
16 Maarten Prak, Republikeinse veelheid, 
democratisch enkelvoud, 149-153; Olaf van 
Nimwegen, De Nederlandse Burgeroorlog (1748-
1815) (Amsterdam 2017) 99. Olaf van Nimwegen 
has argued that the Patriot exercise societies 
arose mainly from William v’s failure to reform 
the army properly.
17 Heinz Schilling, ‘Civic Republicanism in Late 
Medieval and Early Modern German Cities’, 
in: ibidem, Religion, Political Culture and the 
Emergence of Early Modern Society: Essays in 
German and Dutch History (Leiden 1992) 3-59.
Civic militias in historiography
The early modern schutterijen in the Netherlands have extensively been studied 
as examples of civic engagement. In his dissertation on civic militias in the 
province of Holland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Paul 
Knevel has not only explored the militia members’ perception of the city and 
their position in the urban community but also stressed the importance of 
militias as platforms for political ideas. He rejected the idea that the political 
demands of the voluntary militias in the Patriot era were an entirely new 
phenomenon and marked the final disappearance of the early modern civic 
militias.13 Maarten Prak has elaborated this argument in his research on 
the upheavals of 1748 in Leiden and has shown that, because of urban civic 
republicanism, citizens were important political actors in times of crisis, 
while the civic militia functioned as a platform to vent political opinions and 
deliberate on petitions.14 According to Prak, the role of urban civic militias as 
a political force in times of upheaval has been underestimated.15 As a result, 
Prak concludes, the discontinuity between the early modern schutterij and 
Patriot exercise companies was not as fundamental as is generally assumed. 
These companies did not replace the schutterij and were often connected to the 
schutterij through its members and organisation.16 
In his analysis Prak draws upon Heinz Schilling’s concept of civic 
republicanism. According to Schilling, civic republicanism entails a set of 
ideas and values, shared amongst citizens, about the common good (material 
and immaterial) of the urban community as a whole, the privileges and duties 
of citizens within it and the task and responsibilities of urban government. 
This set was primarily politically charged and provoked political language and 
indirect influence by citizens.17 Civic militias, as part of urban society, were the 
embodiment of civic republicanism. Because militiamen were urban citizens, 
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Arming of the ‘Burgersocieteit’ (Citizen Society) of Haarlem in 1795. The 
figure on the left, standing in the front, is Johannes Enschedé’s father. 
Noord-Hollands Archief/Kennemerland, Haarlem. https://hdl.handle.
net/21.12102/dfd0b312-fb8e-11df-9e4d-523bc2e286e2.
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18 Prak, ‘Burgers in beweging’, 372; Knevel, Burgers 
in het geweer, 323-367; Christopher R. Friedrichs, 
Urban politics in Early Modern Europe (London and 
New York 2000) 53-56.
19 ga, toegang 1605, inv.nr. 1195 and 1255 (about 
the renewal of the gewapende burgermagt 
in 1806); Christiaan van der Spek, Sous les 
Armes. Het Hollandse leger in de Franse tijd, 
1806-1814 (Amsterdam 2016) 121-125; Johan 
Joor, De adelaar en het lam. Onrust en opruiing 
en onwilligheid in Nederland ten tijde van het 
Koninkrijk Holland en de inlijving bij het Franse 
Keizerrijk (1806-1813) (Amsterdam 2000); Van 
Nimwegen, De Nederlandse Burgeroorlog, 337. 
On the deployment of the schutterij outside the 
ramparts: Paul Knevel, Burgers in het geweer. De 
schutterijen in Holland 1550-1700 (Hilversum 1994) 
252-270.
the militia was seen not only as the protector of the common good but also as 
the representation of the commons. As a consequence, urban militias gained 
a strong intermediary position between citizens and the urban government. 
This was reinforced by the fact that militiamen were armed and actually held 
the monopoly on violence. This strong position enabled them to oppose the 
urban government and negotiate political claims if the urban government 
happened to forget the importance of the common good.18 
It is clear that the early modern schutterij did undergo some major 
changes from the 1780s onwards. After the restoration of the stadtholderian 
regime in 1787, the Patriot exercise companies fell apart. In 1795 the 
stadtholderian regime collapsed again. The new Batavian government 
continued to insist on the arming of citizens and replaced the early modern 
schutterij with a gewapende burgermagt (‘armed civic troops’), a local militia that 
could be mobilised as a national reserve army in times of crisis. However, 
locally, enthusiasm for a nationally organised militia remained low, especially 
after the failed mobilisation of the gewapende burgermagt in 1799 during the 
English-Russian attack. As a result, the gewapende burgermagt continued to 
be locally organised. A few years later, the Batavian government picked up 
the threads and reorganised the gewapende burgermagt in accordance with 
their earlier plans. In 1806, the year Louis Napoleon took the throne, the 
new king only had to implement the already accepted regulation on these 
militias. Although the early modern schutterij had been deployed occasionally 
outside the ramparts, the national scale and obligatory character of the new 
militias aroused suspicion. People feared it was the first step towards national 
conscription and it provoked many protests. Because of these protests Louis 
Napoleon decided to rename the militias schutterij, thus emphasising that 
the militias were first and foremost responsible for the local peace and order. 
National mobilisation would take place only in times of crisis.19 
Although some major changes took place in the organisation of 
militias, it is my contention that, precisely because of the protest against 
the reform of the schutterij, the resilience of practices and discourse of civic 
republicanism after 1795 is much greater than historians have often assumed. 
Though one could interpret the renaming of the militia as a form of window 
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Johannes Enschedé in 1864, Noord-Hollands Archief/Kennemerland, Haarlem. 
https://hdl.handle.net/21.12102/dfff2684-fb8e-11df-9e4d-523bc2e286e2.
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20 Herman Amersfoort, Koning en kanton. De 
Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse 
krijgsdienst hier te lande, 1814-1829 (The Hague 
1988) 62-66; W.G.M. van der Heijden, Noord-
Brabant in de negentiende eeuw. Een institutionele 
handleiding (Hilversum 1993) 105-110.
21 Joor, De adelaar en het lam, 283-298; See also: Van 
der Spek, Sous les armes, 122-128.
22 Joor, De adelaar en het lam, 207.
23 Frans Willem Lantink, ‘Een leven lang burger. 
Johannes iii Enschedé (1785-1866)’, Haerlem 
Jaarboek 2002 (Haarlem 2003) 72.
24 Van der Heijden, Noord-Brabant in de negentiende 
eeuw, 105-128; Amersfoort, Koning en kanton; 
Ronald van der Wal, Of geweld zal worden gebruikt! 
Militaire bijstand bij de handhaving en het herstel 
van de openbare orde, 1840-1920 (Hilversum 2003).
25 Ben Schoenmaker, Burgerzin en soldatengeest. 
De relatie tussen volk, leger en vloot, 1832-1914 
(Amsterdam 2009) 97-110.
dressing, it appears that to regain local acceptance for the planned reform 
Louis Napoleon had to reckon with the historical background of the urban 
militias. In December 1813, immediately after his arrival, the Prince of 
Orange introduced a bill on the army and the civic militias. The bill contained 
Batavian and Napoleonic, but also early modern elements. The civic militias 
were again renamed schutterijen. Besides, the militias remained responsible for 
local order, but could be used for national purposes in special situations. The 
Prince realised that taking the militia’s historical background into account 
would improve the local acceptance of his bill.20
Moreover, Johan Joor’s work seems to suggest that the protest of 
citizens against the reform of the schutterijen was incited by tacit assumptions 
on the role and importance of civic militias for local urban communities.21 
Joor argues that the old schutterij remained an important platform to 
mobilise protest against the French regime in 1813.22 Though after 1795, 
contemporaries rather practised than theorized civic republicanism. The 
paramilitary interests of someone like Johannes Enschedé for example, who 
plays a central role in the constitution of an urban civic militia in Haarlem in 
1813, evoke questions on the persistence of such practices after 1795. In the 
case of Enschedé, Frans Willem Lantink has remarked that ‘the importance 
of militias for the persistence of urban consciousness [in the first half of the 
nineteenth century] has been overlooked’.23 
Despite the above-mentioned publications, continuities in urban civic 
engagement after 1800 have never been a focal point in Dutch historiography. 
To the degree that nineteenth-century militias have been investigated, 
historians have mainly studied the regulations of the militias and the 
division of labour between civic militias and the army.24 Ben Schoenmaker 
has explored the opinions of army officers regarding the public debate 
on restructuring the army and the arming of citizens. He has pointed to 
the resilience of eighteenth-century Patriot and Batavian ideals in their 
proposals.25 However, neither the importance of urban consciousness and 
civic commitment nor the local roots and organisation of nineteenth-century 
Dutch militias have attracted much attention.
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Parade of the schutterij and its veterans of ‘1813’, celebrating the fiftieth 
 anniversary of ‘1813’ in Groningen, J.W. Karses, 1863. Groninger Archieven/rhc 
Groninger Archieven, Groningen. https://hdl.handle.net/21.12105/ec6541d0-
c836-ae93-3d43-9edd2fddba71.
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26 Aaslestad, ‘Cities and War’, 383.
27 Pröve, Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus 
und die ‘Macht des Volkes’, 471-487; Katherine 
Aaslestad, Place and Politics: Local Identity, 
Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North 
Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Leiden 
2005); Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Republican 
Traditions: Patriotism, Gender and War in 
Hamburg, 1770-1815’, European History Quarterly 
37:4 (2007) 582-602; Krista Cowman, Nina Javette 
Koefoed and Âsa Karlsson Sjörgen, Gender 
in Urban Europe: Sites of Political Activity and 
Citizenship, 1750-1900 (London 2014), especially 
section ii; Michael Rowe, From Reich to State: 
The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830 
(Cambridge 2003).
Students of Dutch history could learn a lot from research on the 
German States in the first half of the nineteenth century. Katherine Aaslestad, 
for example, studied the impact of war on the urban communities of Leipzig 
and Hamburg between 1813 and 1815. Her work shows the resilience of 
urban civil society between 1800 and 1815. In 1813-1815 for instance, in 
reaction to the experience of war and the infringement of local authority, 
citizens constituted voluntary local civic militias to defend their city and 
its surroundings. Such civic initiatives were set up alongside governmental 
initiatives. Moreover, citizens celebrated their civic engagement in 
commemorations and rituals. Aaslestad therefore concludes that ‘cities [...] 
remained an important space – “a third force” – that retained its own interests 
and culture and mediated between the urban population and the state in 
times of conflict and transition’.26
In a study on the political and social meaning of civic militias for 
the development of liberalism and civil society in early-nineteenth-century 
Germany, Ralf Pröve has argued that ideas on the arming of citizens 
blossomed in the first half of the nineteenth century precisely because 
these contained a mixture of civic republicanism and more modern views 
on politically engaged citizenship. The studies of Aaslestad, Pröve and 
others invite us to pose similar questions for the Dutch case, regarding the 
importance of civic engagement, the resilience of local authority and the 
persistence of early modern civic ideas. Their work gives us a hint of where 
continuities can be found: on the local level.27
The regime change of 1813 in Haarlem and Groningen
In 1813 Groningen and Haarlem, citizens cooperated with the urban 
government to safeguard the order in their local community. After several 
days of news about the approach of the allied troops and the passing through 
of French officials, the Cossacks first appeared near the ramparts of Groningen 
at nightfall on 14 November. That evening the prefect had announced his 
short leave to the mayor (maire) W.W. Jullens (1753-1819) and A.W. Senn 
van Basel (1783-1857). Senn van Basel was lieutenant-colonel of the local 
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department of the Nationale Garde. In 1811, after the incorporation of the 
Netherlands into the Napoleonic empire, the Dutch army (nb not the local 
militias) merged into the French army and became the Nationale Garde.28 
Because the departments of the Nationale Garde were locally based and 
recruited, in 1813 most cities housed a department of the Garde.
The prefect had asked Jullens and Senn van Basel to remain in their 
posts until his return and immediately after his departure the gates of the city 
had been shut.29 Subsequently, the militiamen, members of the local militia 
gewapende burgermagt, had taken off their French cockade. The following 
morning Cossacks reappeared and the colonel of the gewapende burgermagt, 
Marcus Busch (1769-1843) and Senn van Basel decided to open the city gates 
and let them in, without consulting the mayor.30 Although this caused some 
changes in the department’s civil service, most of the local officials remained 
in office. The gewapende burgermagt and Nationale Garde almost immediately 
marched out to fight the French troops at Delfzijl.
Haarlem saw a somewhat different role of the civic militia in the 
regime change of 1813. In Haarlem a militia was constituted by the mayor of 
the city, Willem Philip Barnaart (1781-1851), who was officially in service of 
the French government. On 16 November, he sent for Johannes Enschedé and 
asked him to secretly deliberate on the city’s public security. He commanded 
Enschedé to set up a civic militia, an order that contravened the rules of 
French government. This was not without danger, as a French garrison and a 
French department of gendarmes were still in the city.31 
Enschedé invited six men to serve in the militia as captains and 
ordered them to appoint some ‘of the most reliable’ men as their subordinates 
and wait until his sign for action.32 On 18 November a second meeting took 
place between the maire, Enschedé and the commander of the French troops 
who had announced that he would leave the city. During that meeting 
Barnaart asked Enschedé whether he was able to secure order and obedience 
to the French emperor. Enschedé said no and asked the maire to resign from 
office. Next, he decided to appoint a provisional urban government together 
with his captains and ordered these new officials to be present at the city hall 
early next morning. One of the six departments was sent to the doelen, the 
meeting room of former civic militias, to await the moment of withdrawal 
by the French troops. Immediately after their withdrawal, the city gates were 
shut and the new civic militia patrolled the city walls and neighbourhoods. 
After a new urban government had been nominated by Enschedé in his 
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capacity as chief of the civic militia, it was elected by the captains, and 
installed in a joint meeting of the civic militia and the members of the new 
government.33 Most of the ‘new’ urban officials, except the mayor, had already 
been members of the previous government, and thus remained in office.34
In short, in both Haarlem and Groningen the civic militia had a 
decisive role in the regime change. Unlike in Groningen, in Haarlem an 
entirely new militia was constituted which would take over local command. 
In Groningen, on the other hand, the gewapende burgermagt cooperated with 
the local company of the Nationale Garde. Officially the militia’s task was to 
safeguard local order. Yet the Guard clearly felt responsible as well. Though 
both in Haarlem and Groningen the militias had a central role in the regime 
change, the size of this role was dictated by the local situation.
Early modern roots
By looking at Enschedé’s memoirs of 1813, it becomes clear that these local 
differences were not entirely coincidental. In his memoirs he pays a lot of 
attention to seemingly negligible details of the constitution and role of 
the militia in Haarlem. Yet when studied in the light of early modern civic 
republicanism, these details take on a new meaning. 
First, Enschedé discusses in detail the composition of the new civic 
militia. To organise it he used the structure of the six wijken, a division of 
the city into various districts. The early modern schutterij had always been 
organised along these wijken, though the number of districts had varied 
over time. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries every wijk had four 
vendels, or companies.35 Enschedé appointed one captain in every wijk, 
who commanded one company. He thus built upon the former structure 
of the early modern schutterij, but did not fully restore it. His decision was 
made easier by the fact that, although the old schutterij had been formally 
disbanded for a few decades, in practice, it was not dismantled until early 
1813.36 
Next, Enschedé extensively describes the militia’s search for weapons 
and ammunition. For a civic militiaman, it was important to at least bear 
some sort of weapon. However, because of the dismantlement of the schutterij 
and the disarmament of the local department of the Nationale Garde, few 
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weapons could be found in the city of Haarlem. Some militiamen used old 
pikes and lances of the drama society ‘Leerzaam Vermaak’, whereas others 
visited the local blacksmiths in search of arms.37 As a pike from a drama 
society might not be the best weapon to fight the enemy, there must have 
been more at stake here. Apparently, displaying arms clearly marked that the 
monopoly of violence was possessed not by the French government nor by 
the official urban government but by the citizens of Haarlem who retained 
the right to defend themselves. Their behaviour recalls the older ideal of 
the armed citizen as the protector of the common good and the restorer of 
civic freedom: one of the foundations of the schutterij in the Middle Ages that 
again had bloomed during the Patriot era in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.38 The importance Enschedé ascribed to the arming of the civic 
militiamen shows that this ideal was still alive in 1813. Indeed, as I have 
discussed in the introduction of this article, in Groningen too the actions of 
voluntary civic militias were legitimised by referring to the armed citizens 
as protectors of the common good. However, according to Enschedé, the 
arming of citizens functioned only within an institutional framework. If not, 
it would endanger public order. In Beverwijk, for example, several citizens 
armed themselves with weapons that were sold by deserting French soldiers. 
As a result, Enschedé and the maire of Beverwijk did everything possible to 
prevent this from happening.39
Enschedé’s description of the election and appointment of the 
lieutenants too acquires more meaning in light of early modern civic 
republicanism. After their appointment by Enschedé, the lieutenants 
gathered a few of ‘the most reliable residents’ in their own wijk, who in turn 
officially elected their superiors by ‘common agreement’.40 This course 
of events honoured the early modern tradition of the officer picking his 
subordinates in his own wijk.41 However, the subsequent election of officers 
by their subordinates was not a self-evident tradition. After the Dutch Revolt, 
urban governments obtained the right to appoint the militia’s officers, a 
measure aimed at restricting the political influence militias had gained during 
the Revolt. This restriction had been one of the main points of conflict during 
the civic uprisings of 1672 and 1748 in the Netherlands.42 According to the 
protesting militiamen, the right to appoint officers from their own ranks 
would re-establish their independent position. Although Enschedé does not 
explain why he chose to revive this tradition, the very fact that he explicitly 
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mentions this officer election shows his awareness of the tradition and the 
importance he attached to an independent civic militia. 
In addition, Enschedé also explicitly addresses the election of the 
urban government by the elected officers. This is another example of a 
mixture of already existing early modern practices and the realisation of 
early modern quests for reform. As we have seen, Enschedé, in his capacity 
as chief of the civic militia, nominated the members of the new urban 
government. The officers then officially elected these members, after which 
they were installed in a joint meeting with the civic militia.43 In other 
cities, such as Amsterdam and Middelburg, the urban government was also 
nominated and appointed by the civic militia.44 Although Groningen did not 
see an election of a new urban government by militiamen, the chiefs of the 
militias were the ones who decided to open the gates and let the Cossacks in, 
which illustrates their powerful and independent position during the regime 
change.45 
On the one hand, this political influence of armed citizens on the 
urban government reminds us of earlier political demands by civic militias. 
During the Dutch Revolt, in some cities representatives of the civic militia 
were in charge of electing a new urban government.46 Although in later years 
their political power was successfully limited, the influence of the militias 
on local politics remained, especially during political upheavals. In 1748, 
for instance, militias throughout the Netherlands expressed their political 
demands, like the wish to monitor the city’s finances by a committee of 
citizens. After the urban government declined to honour their requests, the 
militias in Leiden and Haarlem explicitly pressed for a replacement of the 
urban government (wetsverzetting) by refusing to execute their tasks.47 Thus, 
as Schilling and Prak have argued, early modern militias were well aware of 
their influence on urban politics. In that way, the civic militias of 1813 stood 
in an age-old tradition of overthrowing an urban government that ignored 
the common good.48
On the other hand, the election of the new government by the civic 
militia in 1813 shows the influence of the Patriot era. In this period, in 
Haarlem a proposal was drafted to give armed citizens influence on the 
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composition of the urban government by indirect election.49 As a result of the 
restoration of the stadtholderian regime in 1787, it was never implemented. 
However, Enschedé was probably well aware of this earlier proposal, especially 
because his father had been one of the leading figures in the Patriot movement 
of Haarlem. His description of the election process also shows that he 
endorsed the political influence of armed citizens on local politics. For him, 
the explicit election of the urban government by representatives of the urban 
community legitimised its power. 
In short, one could argue that Enschedé’s solutions to the mounting 
crisis remained very local. Moreover, his organisation of the civic militia 
followed several traditions from the early modern schutterij and from Patriot 
exercise societies. We can therefore conclude that Enschedé’s solutions very 
much breathed civic republicanism. 
Local authority and urban self-confidence
The natural way in which urban governments and citizens in 1813 relied on 
previous local traditions of crisis management should be seen in light of an 
ongoing struggle over the preservation of local autonomy that had originated 
in the Batavian Era.50 This struggle manifested itself especially in the years 
around the abolition of the urban corporations, such as the civic militias 
and the guilds. For ages access to these institutions had been regulated by 
urban citizenship which was available only to a select group of inhabitants. 
Batavian radicals described this barrier as contradictory to the equality of 
men and therefore from 1795 onwards the National Assembly made serious 
attempts to dismantle the early modern corporations. Not surprisingly, the 
representatives of the National Assembly found strong and confident civic 
institutions in their way.51 In 1813 similar conflicts arose between the new 
general government (algemeen bestuur) in The Hague and the cities of Haarlem 
and Groningen.
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After the establishment of the algemeen bestuur, Van Hogendorp 
immediately started to gather the remaining weaponry in the Netherlands. 
One of his delegates, H.L.F. Eichholtz, was sent to Haarlem around 23 
November, because the algemeen bestuur had heard that some boxes with 
weapons were hidden in the house of the assistant-prefect.52 Johannes 
Enschedé, as chief of the civic militia, denied this rumour, and sent Eichholz 
back stating that he had no official affirmation that a new algemeen bestuur 
had been established in The Hague. Thereupon, Van Hogendorp wrote the 
urban government of Haarlem a letter dripping with sarcasm: ‘As you may 
have noticed from the various and several publications in name of the Prince 
we have established an algemeen bestuur’. The second time Eichholz was sent to 
the city, Enschedé again refused to hand over the few weapons. This time he 
claimed that, among other things, it would weaken the city’s position against 
the withdrawing French troops. Van Hogendorp got angry; in a second letter 
he commanded the city of Haarlem to accept the status of his delegate and 
threatened the city with severe consequences ‘when the prince arrived’.53 The 
urban government of Haarlem was not impressed.
Yet Haarlem was not the only city that dared to oppose the 
algemeen bestuur. Because the city’s local civic militia had marched out to 
fight the French at Delfzijl, in Groningen, in contrast to Haarlem, the 
power was mainly in the hands of maire Jullens. It took days before the news 
of the establishment of the algemeen bestuur reached the city. A delegate 
was sent to Groningen. He tried to persuade the local government to 
wave the orange flag as it was forbidden to wear an orange sash or ribbon. 
Because it took a while before the ban on wearing orange was lifted, some 
historians have pointed to the lack of orangism of the urban government of 
Groningen.54 Others have argued that this independent behaviour of cities 
such as Haarlem and Groningen stemmed from fear of the French troops.55 
It is true that both Haarlem and Groningen wanted to maintain a more or 
less neutral position as long as there was no clear new national political 
framework and the French might be able to march in again. However, if 
we consider the urban governments’ courage in opposing the algemeen 
bestuur and the fact that cities still had the institutional structure in place 
to immediately organise a militia, it is more likely that cities still thought it 
was their right to maintain peace and order on the local level. In the eyes of 
both the civic militiamen and the urban governments in this case the local 
superseded the national.
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However, this explanation ignores the urban civic pride that echoed in 
the language of urban governments and citizens, and it does not explain why 
for instance mayor Jullens of Groningen constantly felt the need to demarcate 
his right to oppose both provincial officials and the members of the algemeen 
bestuur.56 A more convincing explanation can be found in the aforementioned 
struggle over local authority. Local officials felt that the dominant behaviour 
of the algemeen bestuur in The Hague should not limit their own city’s room for 
independent decisions. Therefore Van Hogendorp’s initiative was treated with 
distrust.
That this behaviour was rooted in local pride is highlighted by the fact 
that the urban governments of Haarlem and Groningen treated other supra-
local powers with the same self-confidence as they did the algemeen bestuur. In 
Groningen the commander of the Cossacks, Baron Rosen, immediately took 
over the local military, civil and legal power. In addition, he attempted to 
regulate the city’s finances. His behaviour was considered to be disrespectful 
to the traditions of local authority, whereupon the urban and provincial 
government tried to stop him.57 
The urban government of Haarlem treated the French government 
with similar confidence. On 19 November, assistant-prefect (onder-prefect) 
Ewout van Vredenburch circulated a personal note in which he accused the 
city of Haarlem of rebellion against the French government and stated that 
the riots had caused him to leave the city and resign from office. Former 
Maire Barnaart, who had already resigned from office, wrote him a letter 
‘on behalf of the 20,000 people living in Haarlem’ to express his disbelief 
and grief about the assistant-prefect’s statements. According to the former 
mayor, the assistant-prefect harmed the city’s reputation because no riots had 
taken place, or at least nothing he would qualify as a riot. The former mayor 
then pressed the new provisional urban government to send his letter to the 
assistant-prefect.58 Thereupon the new provisional urban government told 
the assistant-prefect not to compromise the age-old good name of the city of 
Haarlem.59 Both the mayor’s and the urban government’s arguments were 
dictated by civic pride. The former mayor emphasised for instance the spotless 
reputation of Haarlem: the inhabitants of Haarlem had always been orderly 
people and would continue to be so.60 
Besides civic pride, the mayor’s critique of the attitude of the 
assistant-prefect demonstrates clear ideas about proper governance and 
local authority. According to the mayor, the assistant-prefect resigned at the 
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moment his position became shaky, but also when the danger of chaos was 
the greatest. Instead of managing the crisis, the assistant-prefect tried to 
save his reputation by accusing the city of Haarlem, which according to the 
mayor endangered the security of the city. Because the community of Haarlem 
could not defend itself against the insults of the assistant-prefect reprisals 
by the French had to be feared. Moreover, unlike the mayor, who had taken 
measures, the assistant-prefect had refused to give any orders to prevent 
disorder. The assistant-prefect did not sacrifice his position for the sake of 
the urban community as the mayor himself had done after the establishment 
of a new provisional urban government.61 The mayor’s judgement of the 
assistant-prefect’s behaviour reflects his ideal type of governor, someone who 
would rather deny himself than the common good of urban society, which we 
recognise as an ideal type from early modern civic republicanism. However, it 
also shows that in his eyes urban governors should and could independently 
make decisions regarding local order. 
To conclude, in this precarious moment of transition, cities instantly 
fell back on a long-standing institutional experience of local solutions to 
national crisis, rooted in the old regime of the Dutch Republic. Besides, 
cities used this moment to secure their local autonomy against supra-local 
powers. Moreover, to ensure the continuity of daily life in the city the urban 
governments of Haarlem and Groningen could not await national measures, 
but immediately had to take action. Taxes were collected, French officials 
replaced and church services on Sunday reintroduced.62
1813 the last upsurge?
The question arises whether ‘1813’ was a final upsurge of practices of civic 
republicanism and local authority or just one example of a broader persistence 
of urban civic traditions in the nineteenth century. At first glance, one might 
argue that the nineteenth-century Netherlands did not experience any 
comparable crises with such an independent position for cities. Yet, two other 
imminent crises followed later in the century: the Belgian Revolt of 1830 and 
the revolution of 1848. A short exploration of these two moments demonstrates 
that, once seen from a local perspective, these crises also resemble urban forms 
of civic engagement. In that way, some striking similarities with 1813 appear.
In 1830 riots in the city of Brussels in the Southern Netherlands 
soon developed into a full-blown revolution to secure the independence 
of Belgium. The imminent separation of the Northern and Southern 
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Netherlands caused a wave of nationalism in the northern part of the 
country.63 However, a local, urban perspective demonstrates that this 
nationalism was founded on local pride and local voluntary initiatives. 
For many cities in the northwest and northeast of the Netherlands the 
fights in the south near Brussels did not pose an immediate threat. The regular 
militias (schutterij) from northern parts of the country therefore were mobilised 
and marched to the south to assist King William i’s army. However, civic 
militias from cities in North-Brabant and Zeeland were mobilised to protect 
their own communities.64 Northern militias thus crossed local borders and 
fought for a national aim, as was laid down in the law on the militias. In North-
Brabant and Zeeland militias also stayed home to preserve local order and 
peace. In addition to the regular militia several voluntary initiatives emerged, 
as was the case in 1813. Students in Leiden and Utrecht for instance organised 
themselves voluntarily and went to the south.65 Thus not only was the regular 
militia locally organized, but also the voluntary initiatives were locally born.
The same interplay between national and local pride and national 
and local organisational structures can be found in the immense number of 
poems praising the actions of the militias of 1830. Most of them were written 
for a specific company from a specific city. Titles for instance said: ‘For the 
civic militia marching out of Den Bosch’ or ‘On the returning of the militia of 
Zutphen’. Although, as in 1813, these poems contained many references to the 
honour of fighting for the fatherland, militiamen were often encouraged with 
references to the city’s heroic history. Several poems refer to the actions of the 
city’s civic militia during the Dutch Revolt.66 As in 1813, the bravery of the 
civic militia was also celebrated in the local community. In Rotterdam women 
sewed a banner for the militia, whereupon poems were dedicated to this 
feminine engagement in the honouring of ‘our city at the Meuse’.67 Moreover, 
local festivities and public ceremonies were organized to celebrate the return 
of the civic militias.68
During the revolutionary year 1848, the national government fell back 
on this longstanding tradition of urban voluntary initiatives. The Minister 
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of Justice ordered the provinces to command the urban governments in their 
region to organise a militia of volunteers, ‘burgers’, to prevent disorder.69 
The minister thus immediately thought of a local solution for this impending 
national crisis. As a result, the governor of the province of Groningen 
wrote a letter to the urban government of Groningen and ordered them to 
gather some reliable (‘vertrouwde’) men to secretly deliberate on the issue 
of protecting their community should disorder arise – just as the mayor of 
Haarlem had done in 1813. The governor’s selection criteria were remarkable: 
reliable men were ‘inhabitants who, according to their social position would 
have an extraordinary interest in the maintenance of peace and order, 
or inhabitants with influence’.70 Groningen’s governor presupposed an 
interest in urban society only by a select group of men. According to him, 
the willingness to serve the urban community depended on one’s position 
in urban society. Both criteria remind us of the ideals on the engagement of 
citizens with their urban community discussed in this article.71 
In short, the crises of 1830 and 1848 point to the power of urban 
consciousness and civic engagement in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Moreover, these two examples invite us to continue to study the influence of 
early modern forms of civic engagement on Dutch society and governance in 
the nineteenth century. After all, similar questions could be asked with regard 
to other urban corporations. Joost van Genabeek has pointed to the resilience 
of the Dutch guild system because of the central state’s inability to replace the 
system’s economic-social functions in urban society.72 However, the role of 
civic commitment in the resilience of guilds has not gained much attention. 
Neither did King William i’s proposal to reintroduce the guild system, and the 
enthusiasm it met from urban governments and the still existing guilds.73
69 Matthijs van de Waardt in his forthcoming thesis 
on Dirk Donker Curtius. 
70 ga, toegang 1399, inv.nr. 6034, ‘Maatregelen 
genomen bij ordeverstoringen ten gevolge van 
de februari-revolutie in Frankrijk’. Letter from 
the ‘staatsraad, gouverneur van de provincie 
Groningen’ to mayor and alderman (wethouder) of 
the city of Groningen, 4 maart 1848.
71 1861 saw a massive revival of local voluntary 
shooting societies stemming from the feared 
attack by Prussia. Ben Schoenmaker has shown 
how these militias were inspired by two earlier 
traditions: on the one hand, the Patriot and 
Batavian militias (an inspiration for more 
liberal citizens) and, on the other hand, the 
volunteers of 1830/1831 (an inspiration for the 
more conservative, monarchist movement); 
Ben Schoenmaker, Burgerzin en soldatengeest, 107. 
72 Joost van Genabeek, ‘De afschaffing van de gilden 
en de voortzetting van hun functies’, in: neha-
jaarboek 57 (1994) 63-90.
73 The mayor of Groningen responded 
enthusiastically and offered an extensive proposal 
on the reintroduction of the guild system: ga, 
toegang 1605, inv.nr. 527, letter of 30 Augustus 
1814, nr. 253; See for instance Utrecht: Nico 
Slokker, Ruggengraat van de stad. De betekenis van 
gilden in Utrecht, 1528-1818 (Amsterdam 2009) 234; 
In 1814 the bakers of Groningen petitioned for the 
reintroduction of the guild system. Their guild at 
least continued to existed until 1828, whereupon it 
was transformed into an association: ga, toegang 
1325, ‘Gilden, 1317-1883’, inv.nr. 23, omslag 40-106. 
civic militias and political crises in haarlem and groningen 
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that a local approach to the events of 1813 points 
to striking continuities with early modern civic traditions, most notably 
practices of civic republicanism and the persistence of a notion of local 
autonomy. 
This has consequences for our understanding of the regime change 
of 1813. Given the reactions of the urban governments of Haarlem and 
Groningen to Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp’s initiative, one could argue 
that, in the eyes of contemporaries, his driemanschap (triumvirate) was a local 
initiative that only pretended to be the new national government in the 
name of the Prince of Orange. Although the driemanschap initiated a national 
power shift, the regime change started on the local level. Moreover, as the 
cases of Haarlem and Groningen show, the practical solutions to the crisis of 
‘1813’ were neither purely window dressing, nor provoked by a restoration 
agenda. On the contrary, urban citizens and governments smoothly switched 
between the many different practices and institutional legacies from the past 
and chose the one they regarded as the most suitable. Moreover, though the 
early modern corporative institutions were dismantled, the attached political 
discourse and practices affected Dutch local governance at least until the early 
years of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
The persistence of early modern practices of civic republicanism also 
has something to teach us about continuity. One possible response to the 
discovery of previously unsuspected continuities is to argue that a previously 
perceived rupture, in this case the rupture between urban republicanism 
and national agency or an urban corporative society and the nation-state, did 
not happen until later. However, it may be more convincing to reconsider 
the nature of ruptures. In 1813 urban civic republicanism was not replaced 
by national agency, but adapted to the situation. The local pride and local 
organisation of voluntary civic militias during the crisis of 1830 and the 
local solutions to the imminent crisis of 1848, suggest that in the first half 
of the nineteenth century republican traditions still influenced civic and 
governmental solutions to crises. Historians have noted that geographical 
identities (local, national, international, cosmopolitan) remained layered over 
a longer time.74 Probably notions of civic republicanism and national agency 
did as well.
74 Lotte Jensen, Vieren van vrede. Het ontstaan van 
de Nederlandse identiteit, 1648-1815 (Nijmegen 
2016); Remieg Aerts, ‘Hoe nationaal was het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk? Over nationaal besef’, in: 
Remieg Aerts and Gita Deneckere (eds.), Het 
(On)Verenigd Koninkrijk, een politiek experiment 
in de Lage Landen, 1815-1830-2015 (Brussels 
2015); Carolien Boender, ‘Stedelijk patriottisme. 
Haarlem als centrum van de kosmos’, in: ibidem, 
95-102.
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